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1022 
PLEAS’ PROGRESS 
Stephanos Bibas* 
PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN 
AMERICA. By George Fisher. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. 
2003. Pp. xi, 397. $65. 
George Fisher’s new book, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph,1 is really 
three books in one. The first part is a careful, detailed explanation of 
how and why plea bargaining exploded in Middlesex County, 
Massachusetts in the nineteenth century. This part is the fruit of an 
impressive amount of original research in Massachusetts court records 
and newspaper archives. The second part of the book looks more 
broadly at other academic histories of plea bargaining in England, 
California, and New York. It explains how the forces that produced 
plea bargaining in Middlesex County likewise contributed to plea 
bargaining’s rise elsewhere. The final part applies the lessons of 
history to critique current criminal procedure. In particular, Fisher 
criticizes the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for tilting the balance of 
power toward prosecutors. 
Academics have already written a number of histories of plea 
bargaining in Massachusetts and elsewhere, but this one is different. 
Fisher, a former Middlesex County prosecutor and now a professor at 
Stanford Law School, brings his prosecutorial perspective to bear in 
explaining the rise of plea bargaining. I will review Fisher’s book from 
this same perspective, as both of us are plea-bargaining scholars and 
former prosecutors rather than professional historians. 
My thesis is that Fisher adds an important dimension to the history 
of plea bargaining precisely because he looks at it with a prosecutor’s 
eye. Instead of resting on broader social explanations of plea 
bargaining, which have become fashionable of late, Fisher emphasizes 
the caseloads, incentives, and powers of judges and prosecutors. His 
prosecutor’s eye sees the actors’ powers and incentives from a 
rational-actor perspective that purely academic historians often miss. 
 
*  Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law; former Assistant U.S. 
Attorney, Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York 
(bibas@philo.org). B.A. 1989, Columbia; B.A. 1991, M.A. 1998, Oxford; J.D. 1994, Yale. — 
Ed. I am grateful to Tung Yin for his advice and comments on an earlier draft. 
1. George Fisher is Professor of Law, Stanford University. The book is a substantially 
expanded version of an article that Fisher published in the Yale Law Journal. See George 
Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857 (2000). 
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(Though the rational-actor approach looms large in theoretical and 
normative scholarship about plea bargaining today, it is largely absent 
from historical accounts.) 
In particular, Fisher notes that most histories have focused on the 
incentive and desire to bargain while assuming that prosecutors had 
the power to do so. Fisher, however, notes that prosecutors started out 
with the incentive but not the power to bargain, and judges started 
with the power but not the incentive. Over the course of the 
nineteenth century, prosecutors developed powers to bargain 
unilaterally in some cases. Later, judges developed incentives to 
cooperate with prosecutors and spread bargaining more broadly, to 
offset their crushing civil dockets. 
Unfortunately, in discussing prosecutors and judges, Fisher pays 
much less attention to the role of defense counsel. Indeed, his sources 
limit what he can say, as prosecutors drafted the indictments and 
motions in the court files on which he relies. Nonetheless, a fuller 
rational-actor account of plea bargaining must explore the roles of 
defense counsel as well as prosecutors and judges. Defense counsel 
develop bonds of trust with prosecutors and judges and establish going 
rates or prices for particular crimes. In other words, defense counsel 
serve as repeat players. Plea bargaining is possible without defense 
counsel, but repeat players grease the wheels, influence defendants’ 
decisions to plead, and balance other actors’ powers. 
Part I of this Review considers Fisher’s in-depth exploration of 
Middlesex County courts in the nineteenth century. Fisher’s thorough 
review of thousands of court records and newspaper archives explains 
plea bargaining’s rise in two main stages: First, prosecutors used their 
limited powers to bargain without the cooperation of judges. Fixed 
penalties for liquor-law violations and murder gave prosecutors the 
power to charge bargain unilaterally. Prosecutors later developed the 
technique of placing cases on file (in suspension), which eventually 
developed into modern probation. Second, judges, who previously had 
resisted ceding their sentencing power to prosecutorial bargaining, 
acceded to offset the mounting burden of their civil dockets. This 
second step allowed bargaining to expand to embrace all kinds and 
degrees of crime. Fisher is the first scholar to emphasize the growth in 
civil dockets. His account of the forces at work in Massachusetts is far 
superior to those of Theodore Ferdinand and especially Mary Vogel, 
whose work Fisher demolishes.2 
 
2. THEODORE FERDINAND, BOSTON’S LOWER CRIMINAL COURTS, 1814-1850 (1992); 
Mary E. Vogel, The Social Origins of Plea Bargaining: Conflict and the Law in the Process of 
State Formation, 1830-1860, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 161 (1999) [hereinafter Vogel, Social 
Origins]; Mary E. Vogel, Courts of Trade: Social Conflict and the Emergence of Plea 
Bargaining in Boston, Massachusetts, 1830-1890 (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Harvard University) (on file with the University of Iowa College of Law Library) 
[hereinafter Vogel, Courts of Trade]. 
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Part II considers how the lessons of Middlesex County explain the 
rise of plea bargaining elsewhere. Fisher is perhaps too dismissive of 
other scholars, such as John Langbein and Milton Heumann, whose 
accounts of plea bargaining in many ways complement his own.3 
Regardless, Fisher’s rational-actor account convincingly explains how 
and why plea bargaining grew to dominate in New York, California, 
and England, as well as Massachusetts. Here, as in his account of 
Middlesex County, the only thing missing is a fuller appreciation of 
the role of defense counsel. 
Part III concludes with the lessons of the past for the present. In 
recent years, the academic debate over plea bargaining has all too 
often revolved around whether or not to abolish plea bargaining. But 
as Fisher’s account shows, plea bargaining will not disappear any time 
soon, especially because caseloads are so large. Even an unusually 
large drop in caseloads or a few local efforts to ban bargains probably 
would not kill plea bargaining. Judges, lawyers, and defendants have 
come to like the swiftness and certainty of bargaining and would keep 
liking it even if they had time to try every case. These insiders’ 
preferences carry much more weight than the public’s grave suspicion 
of the process. This is true because the insiders have the power, 
personal stakes, and better information about the low-visibility 
bargaining process. Thus, bargaining is here to stay. Plea bargaining 
has triumphed, in Fisher’s phrase, because it has endeared itself to the 
actors with real power. 
We cannot turn back the clock two centuries, and it is pointless to 
keep writing articles that treat jury trials as the norm. More fruitful 
and practical reform would give judges and defense counsel the power 
to check prosecutors. Fisher’s critique of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines rightly emphasizes this point. Prosecutorial control over 
charging and sentencing led to plea bargaining’s rise. Just so, plea 
bargaining’s moderation depends on checking and balancing 
prosecutors’ unilateral charging and sentencing power. The lessons of 
the past contain the seeds of reform for the present. 
I. THE LESSONS OF MIDDLESEX COUNTY 
A. Prosecutors’ Tricks of the Trade 
Fisher’s tale is a minuet of prosecutors’ powers and judges’ 
incentives. His account begins with the appointment of the first 
Middlesex County prosecutor in 1807 (p. 19). In early nineteenth-
century America, public prosecutors worked part-time for low pay, so 
 
3. MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, 
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1978); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea 
Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (1978) [hereinafter Langbein, Torture]. 
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they had to maintain private practices on the side. As a result, they 
had two obvious incentives to plea bargain: First, they sought to ease 
their crushing workloads and to make more time for their paying 
private clients (pp. 40-44). Second, they also liked quick, certain, easy 
victories, which allowed them to boast about their high conviction 
rates (pp. 48-49). 
Though prosecutors’ incentives to plea bargain were clear, their 
powers to plea bargain were not. Before pleading guilty, most 
defendants demanded a quid pro quo — an express or at least implicit 
promise of leniency in return. In most cases, prosecutors could not 
assure defendants that judges would reward pleas with lower 
sentences. Judges set sentences within broad sentencing ranges, and 
prosecutors lacked the power to bind judges’ hands. So, without 
judicial cooperation, prosecutors were powerless (pp. 24-25, 49-51). In 
the early nineteenth century, judges did not share prosecutors’ 
incentives to plea bargain. As full-time, well-paid officials, they lacked 
prosecutors’ incentives to save time for lucrative private practice. 
Also, unlike prosecutors, judges did not see convictions as statistics in 
their win-loss ratios. And, as a matter of principle and pride, they were 
reluctant to surrender their sentencing power to prosecutorial 
bargaining (pp. 52-58). 
Prosecutors could bargain, therefore, only in two exceptional areas 
where they could unilaterally control sentences. First, the 
Massachusetts liquor laws carried fines that were fixed or spanned a 
narrow range. Prosecutors could nolle prosequi (dismiss) counts of an 
indictment unilaterally and set the costs defendants had to pay upon 
conviction. Clever prosecutors would charge each violator with four 
liquor-law counts and nolle three counts in exchange for a guilty plea 
to the fourth. By dropping charges that carried heavy fixed penalties 
and setting costs lower, prosecutors could guarantee lower sentences 
for plea bargains and threaten heavier sentences after trial (pp. 21-30). 
Second, prosecutors had similar power in murder cases, because 
murder carried a mandatory death penalty. Prosecutors could nolle 
the indictment’s allegation of malice aforethought and reduce the 
charge to manslaughter, which was punishable by zero to twenty years’ 
imprisonment. Once again, determinate penalties made charge 
bargaining possible and reliable (pp. 33-35). 
Here Fisher’s prosecutorial eye sees what others have overlooked. 
Theodore Ferdinand, for example, has noticed the concentration of 
pleas and charge bargains in Massachusetts liquor-law cases. 
Ferdinand theorized (1) that constables invented plea bargaining 
while negotiating with criminals for information, (2) that tavern-
keepers were savvy enough to seek bargains, and (3) that there were 
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no victims to oppose bargains involving victimless crimes.4 Though his 
speculation sounds plausible, it rests on no hard facts (pp. 58-61). 
Fisher, in contrast, sees that the pattern of overcharging and nolles 
resembles the way prosecutors overcharge and charge bargain today.5 
He understands the link between fixed liquor-law penalties and the 
prosecutor’s unilateral power to nolle. And so he sees why in 1852 the 
legislature, to ban plea bargaining, required court approval to nolle in 
liquor-law cases. Once prosecutors lost their power to nolle 
unilaterally, charge bargaining in liquor cases ground to a halt (pp. 49, 
51). Fisher’s prosecutorial insight sees the more elegant and 
compelling explanation for these facts that broad-brush paintings of 
social forces miss. 
After the state legislature ended charge bargaining in liquor cases, 
prosecutors used another bargaining trick. In liquor-law and other 
less-serious cases, defendants pleaded guilty in return for having 
prosecutors place their cases “on file.” Convicted defendants were not 
sentenced until the prosecutor chose to move for sentencing. Placing a 
case on file meant putting it in suspense and not moving for sentencing 
unless the defendant later broke the law again. The on-file technique 
is nothing more than an old form of probation (pp. 63-77). Here, as 
elsewhere, Fisher is careful to point out the inferences and lacunae in 
the evidence, but his story is nonetheless convincing. The broader 
lesson he draws is that probation flourished because it furthered 
prosecutors’, and later judges’, interests in plea bargaining. Plea 
bargaining was so popular and powerful that legislative efforts to 
stamp it out caused it to spring up in new procedural forms (pp.        
89-90). 
B. Defense Counsel 
If Fisher’s account is right, one would expect to see plea rates 
increase steadily throughout the nineteenth century. The biggest 
problem for his account is that guilty-plea rates look more like a “V” 
than a steady upward line. They hovered around sixty percent at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, then dropped to around forty 
percent for the middle third of the century, and climbed again to 
eighty percent by the end of the century. Fisher’s explanation is that at 
the beginning of the century, most defendants were likely 
 
4. FERDINAND, supra note 2, at 13, 15, 66, 95, 186 (constabulary explanation); id. at 81 
(defining Ferdinand’s category of “vice or regulatory” offenses to encompass liquor-law 
violations); id. at 50 tbl.2.2, 59 tbl.2.3, 77, 79 tbl.3.6 (showing pattern of bargaining in these 
cases). 
5. Cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (holding that due process permits 
prosecutors to threaten and carry out threats to file higher charges if defendants refuse to 
plead guilty; treating overcharging and forgoing charges as part of the “give-and-take” of 
negotiation). 
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unrepresented. Instead of trying to defend hopeless cases themselves, 
they pleaded guilty without bargains and threw themselves on the 
mercy of the court (pp. 93 tbl.4.1, 95-100). Thus, increasing rates of 
representation helped to lower plea rates. Fisher forthrightly admits 
the evidentiary hole in his argument: there is no solid evidence of 
representation rates before 1844 (p. 96). The account is plausible but 
invites more questions. One would think that prosecutors were more 
tempted to buy off represented defendants with plea bargains. After 
all, defense counsel made cases more time-consuming to try, were 
more likely to win, and were shrewder about bargaining possibilities. 
Fisher’s answer is that prosecutors lacked the power to bargain, 
because they would not put serious cases on file and let defendants go 
(p. 101). 
The other question is why plea rates spiked upwards late in the 
century. Fisher’s explanation is that Massachusetts granted defendants 
the right to testify on their own behalf. This inadvertently hurt their 
trial prospects: if they remained silent, jurors assumed they were 
guilty. But if they took the stand, denied guilt, and were convicted, 
judges penalized them more harshly for perjury. Pleas came to seem a 
safer course (pp. 104-10). Once again, while Fisher’s account is 
plausible, there is little solid evidence. The problem is that defendants 
never explain why they are pleading guilty, and defense lawyers rarely 
speak publicly about their clients’ motivations. Fisher’s account rests 
on a few press reports, plausible but unproven. To his credit, Fisher is 
candid about this limitation (p. 111). 
Fisher’s account would be more satisfying if it devoted more 
attention to defense counsel. Defense counsel improved their clients’ 
prospects at trial and increased the length of trial. They also increased 
the likelihood that defendants would plead guilty in exchange for clear 
concessions (pp. 98-100). Fisher suggests that represented defendants 
saw that their chances were better and so were less likely to plead 
guilty without bargains, out of desperation. Unfortunately, he does not 
reflect upon the other ways in which counsel probably facilitated 
bargains: Defense counsel doubtless served an informational role, just 
as they do today. They must have developed a sense of the going rate 
for particular crimes. They must have told clients what was a good 
deal for a particular case and must have encouraged them to demand 
appropriate concessions. And, as repeat players, defense counsel must 
have built bonds of trust with prosecutors, making bargains more 
reliable and so more desirable for both prosecutors and defendants.6 
All of these factors probably facilitated plea bargaining, setting the 
 
6. See HEUMANN, supra note 3, at 69-91 (describing how defense counsel learn the value 
of the case, develop working relationships with prosecutors, and discover what discounts are 
possible in various types of cases). 
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stage for bargaining’s dramatic rise once judges saw benefits from 
accepting pleas. 
C. Caseloads Caused Judges to Embrace Bargaining 
Fisher’s account shows that plea bargaining could progress only so 
far without the assent of judges. Without it, prosecutors could bargain 
only where they controlled sentencing: liquor-law cases, murder cases, 
and less-serious cases that they could put on file. The capstone of the 
Middlesex County story is why judges abandoned their opposition to 
plea bargaining and went along with prosecutors. The earliest scholars 
of plea bargaining explained it as a response to rising caseloads, a way 
for courts to lighten their dockets.7 More recently, Mary Vogel, 
Theodore Ferdinand, and Milton Heumann have disputed “the myth 
of caseload pressure” as a cause of plea bargaining.8 
Fisher rehabilitates caseload pressure as the explanation for 
judicial acquiescence in plea bargaining in several stages. First, Fisher 
exposes flaws in these authors’ data correlating caseloads and pleas. 
Fisher shows that the data are either unreliable or in fact support the 
caseload-pressure hypothesis (pp. 9, 45-47, 294 n.31). 
Second, Fisher shreds Vogel’s cultural and political explanation for 
plea bargaining. Vogel claims that the newly enfranchised masses 
chafed under the enforcement of social order. Political elites, she 
claims, resolved the tension by bestowing “episodic leniency” on guilty 
pleas, thereby maintaining order while pleasing voters.9 As Fisher 
shows, however, the pattern of leniency was too small for the public to 
notice (pp. 141-43). Contemporary newspapers and legislative reports 
contained almost no mention of plea bargaining, and what little 
attention it drew was unfavorable (pp. 144-51). Plea bargaining, in 
short, was not well known and was unpopular when it was known.10 If 
outsiders were not pressing for plea bargaining, the impetus must have 
come from actors within the criminal justice system. This insight 
underscores the value of a rational-actor analysis of the actors’ 
incentives. 
 
7. Justin Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1927); 
Raymond Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 97 (1928). 
8. Vogel, Courts of Trade, supra note 2, at 163-65; accord Milton Heumann, A Note on 
Plea Bargaining and Case Pressure, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 515 (1975) [hereinafter Heumann, 
Case Pressure]; see also FERDINAND, supra note 2, at 93 (“Whether plea bargaining was a 
response to burgeoning caseloads . . . is debatable.”). 
9. Vogel, Social Origins, supra note 2, at 165-66, 200, 232-33. 
10. See also Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of ‘Public’ Prosecutors in 
Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1336-37, 1385-86 (2002) (citing 
nineteenth-century New York City press clippings to show that when the public did learn of 
plea bargaining, it was outraged by the practice). 
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Finally, Fisher has the insight to look at judges’ overall workloads, 
instead of just their criminal dockets. On the criminal side, cases per 
judge peaked in the mid-nineteenth century and then declined while 
pleas rose (pp. 116-17). Moreover, criminal trials did not grow much 
longer until the end of the century, contrary to Langbein’s explanation 
for plea bargaining’s rise.11 But judges’ civil dockets were exploding. 
As the population grew and mechanization spread, people began to 
suffer many more injuries on railroads and streetcars and in factories 
and textile mills. Tort suits were more time-consuming than the old 
civil-contract cases (pp. 121-24). Judges could do little to reduce their 
civil caseloads, but they could offset them by disposing of their 
criminal cases quickly. (This argument of course assumes that the 
same judges had both civil and criminal dockets, which is often but not 
universally true.) Judges controlled sentences, whereas juries 
controlled liability and damages. Thus, as Fisher perceptively notes, 
judges “had far greater power to coerce pleas on the criminal side than 
to induce settlements on the civil side” (p. 123). Judges could promote 
pleas by promising rewards, or by habitually following prosecutors’ 
sentence recommendations, or by letting defendants withdraw their 
pleas if the sentence exceeded the recommended one (pp. 129-36). 
Though in hindsight the role of civil cases seems to be common sense, 
Fisher is the first to see it. 
Fisher’s analysis is brilliant in its elegant simplicity. Until now, 
scholars assumed that actors had the power to bargain, rather than 
pointing to the precise sources of this power. Ordinarily, prosecutors 
and judges must join forces to generate plea bargains. Before the civil-
docket crunch, prosecutors had the incentive but not the power to 
bargain, whereas judges had the power but not the incentive. 
Prosecutors found small pockets of power that they could exercise 
unilaterally in liquor-law and murder cases and then in cases minor 
enough for on-file treatment. But once civil-caseload pressure changed 
judges’ incentives, they worked together with prosecutors to bargain 
more broadly. Scholars need not invoke a complex, cumbersome 
congeries of cultural and social forces to explain plea bargaining’s rise. 
The courtroom actors all came to like it as a way to counteract 
caseload pressure, and so it triumphed despite public ignorance and 
legislative opposition. 
II. THE MARCH OF BARGAINING ELSEWHERE 
The Middlesex County tale is the core of Fisher’s book and 
occupies about three-fifths of its text. Middlesex County is interesting 
not only in its own right, but also because it casts light on the march of 
 
11. Pp. 117-21; Langbein, Torture, supra note 3, at 3, 11. 
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plea bargaining elsewhere. Fisher devotes a chapter to explaining how 
the forces in Middlesex County produced plea bargaining in three 
other jurisdictions: England, California, and New York. Some scholars 
have criticized Fisher for building on one narrow case study instead of 
starting with a broader statistical net, but this objection is unfair.12 
Fisher’s strength is his focused depth in the first part of the book, 
which lays a solid foundation for his breadth later on. Fisher makes a 
powerful case that the forces he identified in Middlesex County 
manifested themselves elsewhere as well. 
Fisher begins with England and asks why plea bargaining was rare 
if not absent in eighteenth-century England. John Langbein and 
Malcolm Feeley have shown that there was no plea bargaining in the 
Old Bailey (London’s main criminal court) in the eighteenth century. 
They argued that the reason for the lack of bargaining was the brevity 
of trials, which took hours or minutes instead of days.13 This 
explanation is a variant of the caseload-pressure hypothesis. As trial 
length grew, so did the total time demanded to try all cases. As judges 
became busier, so the argument goes, they had to use pleas to lessen 
their workloads. 
Fisher agrees that there was little or no plea bargaining but points 
to a powerful alternative explanation: the absence of public 
prosecutors until the late nineteenth century. In England, victims had 
to prosecute their own cases as private prosecutors because there were 
no public prosecutors. As the Middlesex case study shows, public 
prosecutors had the incentives to bargain and had some power, 
especially the power to nolle. English crime victims lacked this power. 
They did have some incentive to bargain to save time and money and 
to avoid the risk of loss (pp. 155-56). (Fisher should have added the 
obvious point that victims still had less incentive to bargain than public 
prosecutors, who lacked personal stakes in seeing justice done.) 
Victims did find a few ways to bargain, for example by not showing up 
to testify in exchange for cash. Generally, however, private 
prosecutors lacked the legal tools and expertise to bargain (pp. 156-
57). The lesson of Middlesex is that bargaining requires power and 
 
12. Compare Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 
101-02 (2002) (criticizing Fisher’s Yale Law Journal article, on which this book is based, for 
not “collect[ing] as much data as feasible” and for trying to draw inferences about both 
Middlesex County and America more broadly), with Jack Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule, 
Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 160 (2002) 
(dismissing Epstein & King’s criticism that Fisher should have engaged in “large-number 
statistical empiricism” that would have resulted in “thin observations about many 
jurisdictions,” because Fisher’s in-depth historical study enabled him to make valuable 
“thick observations about one” jurisdiction). 
13. Malcolm M. Feeley, Legal Complexity and the Transformation of the Criminal 
Process: The Origins of Plea Bargaining, 31 ISR. L. REV. 183, 190, 199 fig.3, 202-05 (1997); 
John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 261, 262-65 (1979) [hereinafter Langbein, Understanding]. 
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knowledge of the legal system. With neither the power to nolle nor the 
expertise of repeat players, private prosecutors could not bargain. 
Fisher also notes that Old Bailey judges had little incentive to bargain. 
Their caseloads were growing very slowly, and the thorough press 
coverage of the Old Bailey would have exposed any sentence 
bargaining to uncomfortable scrutiny (pp. 157-58).  
I would add that the absence of defense counsel was another 
impediment to plea bargains.14 Though we often think of defense 
counsel as adversaries who fight the prosecution at every turn, in fact 
their role is much more cooperative and facilitates bargains. The 
absence of defense counsel deprived defendants of repeat players who 
knew the system, had developed trust with other actors, and knew the 
value of cases. In addition, there were no defense counsel to combat 
clients’ overconfidence, offering them sobering assessments of their 
trial prospects and persuading them to plead guilty. Sometimes 
defense counsel’s assessments are clear-eyed; at other times, they may 
be jaundiced and self-serving, as lawyers seek to dispose of cases and 
collect their fees quickly. Either way, defense counsels’ advice might 
well have produced more plea bargains and fewer trials. 
Fisher treats his explanation as a novel alternative to Feeley and 
Langbein’s, but it would be fairer to understand it as a complement. 
Though sometimes bargaining has risen without trials becoming 
longer, at other times longer trials have correlated with rises in plea 
bargaining. More procedural rights, longer trials, and increasing case 
filings cause congested dockets and caseload pressure to plea bargain. 
The more time-consuming each trial is and the more cases there are, 
the more cases have to be disposed of by other means. Thus, as Fisher 
acknowledges in his prologue, his caseload explanation supplements 
Langbein’s but in truth does not supplant it (pp. 9-10). 
Where English judges faced less press scrutiny, plea bargaining 
took off. Fisher studied sentencing patterns for petty larceny in 
Manchester in the late eighteenth century. He found that almost half 
of defendants who stood trial suffered seven years’ transportation 
abroad, which included a dangerous ocean voyage to Australia or 
elsewhere. In contrast, every single defendant who pleaded guilty got 
a short term of imprisonment instead of a dangerous exile (pp. 158-
59). Fisher’s main explanation is that Manchester’s petty larceny 
caseload quadrupled within a generation (pp. 159-60).15 In addition, in 
 
14. Langbein, Understanding, supra note 13, at 263. Although Langbein noted the 
absence of prosecutors and defense counsel, he used this fact only to explain that trial 
procedures were much simpler before lawyers complicated things. 
15. This dramatic growth makes sense. Manchester was one of the new industrial cities 
that burgeoned in the Industrial Revolution, which must have brought many more industrial 
accidents and tort suits as well as crimes, whereas London had long been a large, bustling 
city and was not growing as fast. See William Roberts, A Charge to the Grand Jury of the 
Court Leet, for the Manor of Manchester, in 9 THE COURT LEET RECORDS OF THE MANOR 
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1790 the magistrates’ new house of corrections opened, which at the 
time was a novel penological effort to reform convicts. Reform-
minded magistrates may have offered this new opportunity to 
defendants who were the most promising candidates for reform, 
namely those who pleaded guilty and seemed contrite (pp. 159-60). 
The burgeoning caseload of Manchester fits well with Fisher’s 
rehabilitation of the caseload pressure explanation in Middlesex 
County. 
Fisher then crosses the Atlantic to consider two American 
jurisdictions. First, he reviews Lawrence Friedman and Robert 
Percival’s history of criminal justice in Alameda County, California, 
between 1870 and 1910.16 During that time, guilty pleas grew more 
slowly than in Middlesex County. Guilty pleas to the charges in the 
original indictment increased from 12% to 32% of all pleas entered as 
guilty pleas to lesser offenses decreased from 10% to 4%.17 There was 
little charge bargaining, Fisher argues, because prosecutors had little 
power to do so. In 1851, the California legislature took the power to 
nolle away from prosecutors and gave the power to dismiss to judges.18 
Just as this step killed liquor-law charge bargaining in Middlesex 
County, so it greatly limited post-indictment charge bargaining in 
Alameda County (pp. 161-62). Also, judges had less incentive to 
bargain. There were many more judges and many fewer cases in 
Alameda County, which meant much less caseload pressure (pp.    
163-64). 
Although Alameda County judges had little interest in plea 
bargaining, the other actors did. Defense lawyers gained incentives to 
bargain in 1872 when the California state legislature enacted 
recidivism enhancements with stiff mandatory minimum sentences.19 
Further legislation in 1880 created the preliminary examination, which 
 
OF MANCHESTER app. I, at 243 (Manchester, Henry Blacklock & Co. 1889) (reporting that 
Manchester’s population was growing so quickly that the criminal courts could not hear and 
punish all crimes); ROBERT ROBSON, THE ATTORNEY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY 
ENGLAND app. IV, at 166-67 (1959) (reporting that from 1790 to 1800 the number of 
practicing attorneys in London grew from 1755 to 1800, whereas the number in Manchester 
grew from 40 to 61). Compare David Cody, A Brief History of London, The Victorian Web, 
at http://65.107.211.206/history/hist4.html (last visited July 14, 2003) (reporting that London’s 
population increased from 300,000 in 1700 to 750,000 in 1760 to 900,000 in 1800), with 
SPARTACUS EDUC., Manchester,  at http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/ 
ITmanchester.htm (last modified July 25, 2002) (reporting that Manchester and neighboring 
Salford grew from about 25,000 in 1772 to 95,000 in 1800). 
16. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE: 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, 1870-1910 (1981). 
17. Id. at 174 tbl.5.12 (tabulating all pleas of guilty or not guilty, and so excluding cases 
that were continued indefinitely or dismissed before plea, for example). 
18. Act of May 1, 1851, ch. 29, §§ 597, 598, 1851 Cal. Stat. 212, 279. 
19. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 666, 667 (Bancroft-Whitney Co. 1885); Ex parte 
Gutierrez, 45 Cal. 429, 430 (1873). 
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allowed prosecutors and defense counsel to meet and review evidence 
before prosecutors filed charges.20 But, as noted, judges still lacked the 
incentive to go along. So prosecutors and defense counsel struck 
charge bargains before the filing of formal charges. By doing so, they 
averted the harsh mandatory sentences and circumvented judges’ 
power over dismissal of already-filed charges. This explains why pleas 
to the offense charged rose dramatically as pleas to lesser offenses 
plummeted (pp. 165-66). Once Fisher explains the point in terms of 
the powers and incentives of the actors, it seems obvious in hindsight. 
And yet the point eluded a legal historian as eminent as Lawrence 
Friedman, who lacked a prosecutor’s eyes. 
Finally, Fisher considers New York, relying on two studies, one by 
Raymond Moley, the other by Michael McConville and Chester 
Mirsky.21 Beginning around 1830, guilty pleas rose from almost zero to 
more than three-quarters of all dispositions before the end of the 
century.22 Seventy percent (or more) of guilty pleas in New York City 
were to lesser offenses, which suggests a huge amount of charge 
bargaining.23 The caseload of New York City’s major criminal court 
quintupled between 1839 and 1865,24 which probably created great 
caseload pressure to plea bargain (pp. 167-68). 
Based on the example of Middlesex County, Fisher supposes that 
prosecutors were the ones doing the charge bargaining to alleviate the 
increased workloads. His question, then, is where they found the 
power to do so. The 1829 criminal code, enacted just as guilty pleas 
began to rise, divided crimes into multiple degrees. For example, first-
degree burglary was punishable by a minimum of ten years’ 
imprisonment, second-degree burglary by five to ten years, and third-
degree burglary by zero to five years.25 Prosecutors could charge first-, 
second-, and third-degree burglary in the same indictment and then 
nolle the higher-degree counts as part of a charge bargain.26 The code 
contained many minimum sentences for degrees of burglary, robbery, 
 
20. FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 16, at 43-44. 
21. Mike McConville & Chester Mirsky, The Rise of Guilty Pleas: New York, 1800-1865, 
22 J.L. & SOC’Y 443 (1995); Moley, supra note 7. 
22. McConville & Mirsky, supra note 21, at 466 fig.3; Moley, supra note 7, at 108. 
23. McConville & Mirsky, supra note 21, at 466 (reporting 70% in an 1865 sample); 
Moley, supra note 7, at 111 (reporting 85% in 1926, though rates were much lower outside of 
New York City). 
24. McConville & Mirsky, supra note 21, at 463. 
25. 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 3, § 21 (1829). 
26. 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 2, tit. 4, § 51 (1829); People v. Porter, 4 Park. 524, 526 
(N.Y. Oyer & Terminer 1860). Although some statutory language required court approval 
for nolles, prosecutors appear to have continued to nolle individual counts freely, either 
because the nolle restriction was not read to limit nolles of individual counts or because 
judges, used to the prior nolle practice, routinely assented. Pp. 171-74. 
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forgery, manslaughter, and arson.27 These mandatory minima allowed 
prosecutors to tie judges’ hands and to credibly threaten higher 
sentences after trial, which induced defendants to plead guilty. 
Defendants could also plead guilty to attempts instead of completed 
crimes, which lowered their sentencing ranges.28 Thus, in McConville 
and Mirsky’s 1865 sample of guilty pleas to lesser offenses, forty-seven 
percent were reductions from completed crimes to attempt.29 Finally, 
the 1829 New York Code enacted stiff minimum sentences for repeat 
offenders, which prosecutors may have been able to bargain away.30 
Fisher’s analysis of statutory power explains why plea bargaining in 
New York took the form of charge bargaining and why it started its 
rise earlier than elsewhere, around 1830. Once the law gave 
prosecutors the tools to bargain, they used them as broadly as the law 
allowed, just as they did in Middlesex County. 
III. LESSONS OF THE PAST FOR THE PRESENT 
In his last two chapters, Fisher draws together the strands of his 
history to understand the principles underlying plea bargaining. As 
earlier in the book, his focus is on the courtroom actors and their 
powers and incentives to bargain. He begins by looking at how plea 
bargaining serves courtroom actors. Bargaining is efficient, assures 
victory, and guards against reversal (especially once appellate review 
expanded in the nineteenth century). So far, all of what Fisher says is 
consistent with what Milton Heumann and others have long pointed 
out.31 There is only one flaw: Fisher’s discussion of prosecutors’ and 
judges’ incentives is once again marred by his omission of defense 
counsel’s incentives from the picture. (As we shall see, however, he 
does touch on the issue somewhat later.) 
Next, Fisher turns to how plea bargaining serves the criminal-
justice system. By delivering verdicts that appear truthful in clear 
cases, it keeps juries from getting easy cases wrong. When a jury gets 
the Rodney King or O.J. Simpson case wrong, the public loses faith in 
the system as a whole. But these cases are anomalies that would 
ordinarily result in plea bargains. By skimming off almost all easy 
cases, plea bargaining leaves only hard ones for trial. And when only 
hard cases go into the black box, there are no clear cases left for juries 
to get wrong. The result is more faith in the system. In short, plea 
 
27. 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 1, § 1; id. at pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 3, §§ 9, 20, 21, 57 (1829). 
28. See, e.g., 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 3, § 21; id. at pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 7, §§ 3(2), 27 
(1829) (implying that attempts were lesser-included offenses of completed crimes). 
29. McConville & Mirsky, supra note 21, at 466-67. 
30. Pp. 169-71; 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 7, §§ 8(1), 9(2) (1829). 
31. Pp. 175-77; see, e.g., HEUMANN, supra note 3, at 110-14, 144. 
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bargaining protects the public perception of legitimacy and justice, by 
averting blatantly wrong outcomes.32 The irony is that plea bargaining, 
having swallowed up most trials, now protects the jury ideal and the 
few actual trials that remain. 
Plea bargaining has proven to be so powerful that it fostered 
procedures that are compatible with it and stunted those that could 
stand in its way. Fisher’s previous discussion of how on-file plea 
bargaining led to probation’s rise in Middlesex County is an example 
of a symbiosis of these two procedures. In contrast, he argues that plea 
bargaining thwarted the growth of truly indeterminate sentences, 
which were premised on individualized assessments of rehabilitation 
while in prison. Because true indeterminate sentencing would have 
left all sentencing to the discretion of prison and parole authorities, it 
would have made the benefits of guilty pleas speculative and thus 
undesirable. To avert this problem, judges rarely exercised their 
option to impose indeterminate sentences when they had a choice. 
Parole boards granted near-automatic parole after the minimum term, 
and they were more likely to parole defendants who had pleaded 
guilty. Finally, judges sentenced defendants to narrow ranges (say, 
eight to nine years instead of five to fifteen), leaving much less 
discretion to parole boards. In short, defendants who pleaded guilty 
could effectively predict their sentences, because judges and parole 
boards behaved in predictable ways. The effect was to stunt the ideal 
of indeterminacy as the price for plea bargaining (pp. 181-93). I have 
only one quibble: Fisher personifies plea bargaining and often speaks 
of how it swept away all obstacles in its path, as if it had life and power 
of its own. This anthropomorphic locution is not only jarring, but also 
obscures the human actors who had the incentives and found the 
powers to make it happen. Nonetheless, his account is a compelling 
tale of how the actors who benefited from plea bargaining could 
sabotage reforms that got in their way. 
Fisher also does a nice job of showing how the growth of public 
defenders complemented plea bargaining. Some of the early advocates 
of public-defender systems argued that public defenders would work 
not only to acquit the innocent, but also to convict the guilty! 
Encouraging guilty pleas, they argued, was both more efficient and 
better for rehabilitation because confession is the first step toward 
reform (pp. 194-96). Perhaps these statements were sincere, or 
perhaps they were merely for public consumption. Either way, 
advocates knew they had to sell the system to the powers that be as an 
 
32. Pp. 178-80; cf. Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and 
Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 
1361, 1386-88, 1407 (2003) (arguing that Alford pleas, which are guilty pleas by those whom 
the public perceives may be innocent, undercut public faith in and the legitimacy of the 
criminal-justice system). 
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adjunct to plea bargaining (pp. 196-97). Thus, it is no surprise that 
public defenders had the highest guilty-plea rates: seventy percent, as 
compared to sixty-two percent for appointed private counsel and 
forty-nine percent for privately paid lawyers. Fisher correctly chalks 
these plea rates up to caseload pressure and the desire to keep good 
working relations with judges and prosecutors (pp. 198-200). 
Closely related to Fisher’s points are some other incentives that 
public defenders have to plea bargain. As repeat players, public 
defenders have more plea-bargaining expertise, which should make 
bargains better, more trustworthy, and more predictable for 
defendants. And the guilty-plea rates cited above suggest that fee 
structures may have affected bargains. Public defenders, often 
overworked and paid a flat salary, have the strongest incentives to 
plea bargain. Court-appointed private counsel typically receive hourly 
fees subject to a low cap, which makes trials unprofitable. In contrast, 
private lawyers who are paid by the hour earn more if they go to trial 
and so have less pressure to bargain. Though Fisher does not express 
these observations, all of these points complement his account. 
By focusing on powers and efficiency, Fisher brings a fresh 
perspective to the debate over the Warren Court’s criminal procedure 
revolution. Liberals typically praise Miranda and other rights as 
ensuring fair trials, while conservatives fear that they let the guilty 
walk free on technicalities. Both criticisms, however, ignore the impact 
of plea bargaining. Because the new rights made trials even more 
cumbersome (echoing Langbein’s point), they increased the efficiency 
gains from plea bargaining. And by giving the parties yet another 
dimension along which to bargain, the rights created more 
opportunities to bargain. The upshot was not fairer trials or scot-free 
criminals, but discounted sentences in exchange for waivers of these 
rights (pp. 202-03). New procedural rights, ironically, meant fewer 
trials and less process. 
Fisher’s final chapter looks at the balance of power between judges 
and prosecutors. First, he notes that the advent of bench trials in the 
twentieth century may have checked prosecutors. The early plea-
bargaining theorist Raymond Moley thought that judges would check 
plea bargaining if they could.33 Fisher sees, however, that judges have 
come to like bargaining’s efficiency and would use the power of bench 
trials to strike more bargains. Ordinarily, prosecutors have great plea-
bargaining power because they can charge offenses that carry 
mandatory minimum sentences and then bargain them away. But in 
those states that allow defendants to choose bench trials without 
prosecutorial approval, judges can subvert prosecutorial overcharging. 
The judge can advise the defendant to choose a bench trial, at which 
 
33. Moley, supra note 7, at 127. 
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the judge will acquit of the highest charge to reduce the sentence. This 
counterweight restores some check on prosecutorial power. The result 
is that judges moderate sentences, resulting in more plea bargains at 
more lenient levels (pp. 205-09). As far as I know, Fisher is the first to 
make this point. He draws on his personal experience as a prosecutor, 
and his point accords with my own experience as well.34 
Conversely, if prosecutors can veto bench trials and charge many 
crimes with mandatory minima, they can thwart judicial leniency. 
Today, many states give prosecutors this veto, and many statutes 
contain mandatory minima. As Fisher perceptively notes, rigid 
sentencing guidelines are the functional equivalent of mandatory 
minima, as they tie judges’ hands and their ability to check prosecutors 
(p. 210). 
Fisher critiques the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for further skewing 
the balance of plea-bargaining power. The Guidelines have arguably 
succeeded in their stated goal of cabining judicial discretion. They 
have not, however, counteracted prosecutors’ substantial charging 
discretion. The Guidelines try to offset prosecutorial discretion by 
considering the defendant’s actual conduct and not just the offense 
charged. Prosecutors can trump the Guidelines, however, by charging 
offenses with low statutory maxima or high statutory minima. The 
result is a substantial imbalance of power in favor of prosecutors (pp. 
210-13). 
The Sentencing Commission thought that prosecutorial leniency 
was a source of sentencing disparity and that the solution was judicial 
power to increase sentences. Thus, the Guidelines empower judges to 
reject overly lenient plea bargains and to include uncharged conduct 
in sentences. Most judges, however, like plea bargains and dislike the 
newly increased penalties. So, few judges reject bargains or demand 
harsher terms at the risk of triggering a trial. The bigger problem is 
not checking prosecutorial leniency but checking prosecutorial 
harshness. Prosecutors can overcharge to gain leverage for harsh 
sentences, and judges have little power to check prosecutorial 
harshness. If judges try to cut sweet deals unilaterally, say by departing 
from the Guidelines, they face appellate reversal (pp. 212-21). 
In theory, the Guidelines are merely guidelines and leave judges 
flexibility to depart upward or downward in atypical cases.35 Indeed, 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed district courts’ discretion to do so in 
Koon v. United States.36 Nonetheless, appellate courts have read Koon 
 
34. See also Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a 
World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1155-59 & 1155 n.346 (2001) (citing Fisher, supra 
note 1, at 1072). 
35. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A.4(b) (2002). 
36. 518 U.S. 81 (1996). 
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narrowly, district courts remain afraid of reversal if they depart, and 
Congress has recently abrogated Koon by legislation.37 Thus, fewer 
than one percent of cases receive upward departures, and no more 
than about seven percent of cases receive downward departures over a 
prosecutor’s objection (pp. 217-18). Appellate review deters deviation 
from the sentencing range set by the prosecutor’s charges and the 
parties’ factual stipulations. The result is an imbalance of bargaining 
power. 
The Guidelines have had the unintended consequence of driving 
up plea bargaining and reducing the number of trials still further. By 
making sentences more predictable, they have reduced uncertainty 
and the corresponding chance that defendants will go to trial out of 
optimistic hope for judicial leniency (pp. 223, 225). And with their 
intricate calculations, they create many more dimensions along which 
parties can strike deals. The parties can now bargain over charges, the 
true facts, the applicability of sentencing factors, and cooperation with 
law enforcement (pp. 227-29). Far from thwarting plea bargaining, the 
Guidelines have simply channeled it into new avenues. 
The broader lesson here is that plea bargaining is a force that is 
here to stay. Legislatures have tried to stamp it out, academics have 
argued against it, and theorists have proposed elaborate alternatives 
to it. To give two examples, the Guidelines’ real-offense sentencing 
system was supposed to peg sentences to defendants’ actual conduct 
and thus eliminate bargaining over what crimes to charge. And the 
fixed reduction for acceptance of responsibility was supposed to 
replace negotiable, bargained discounts for pleas.38 But today, no set 
of rules can abolish bargaining or put the genie back in the bottle. The 
font of bargaining, as Fisher’s history shows, is the desire for efficiency 
and the power to manipulate charges and sentences. Prosecutors, 
judges, and defense counsel have long since become addicted to the 
efficiency of bargaining. Perhaps in isolated places a powerful figure 
can stand against the tide for a time, by appealing to the public’s 
understandable distrust of bargaining.39 Over time, however, the desire 
for speedy, certain, efficient convictions causes even these isolated 
 
37. See Douglas A. Berman, A Year in the Life of the Guidelines: The Supreme Court 
Speaks, the Commission is Quiet, and Federal Sentencing Continues Largely Unchanged, 9 
FED. SENTENCING REP. 280, 280-81 (1997) (noting that Koon had little noticeable effect on 
departure rates). Recent legislation abrogated Koon, substituting de novo appellate review 
of decisions to depart. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 § 401(d) (2003). This legislation 
does, however, retain deferential review of the extent of departures that are otherwise 
justified. Id. 
38. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2002). 
39. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 29 (2002) (describing New Orleans’ restrictions on plea bargaining). 
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bargaining bans to crumble.40 What matters ultimately is not the 
public’s suspicions, but the courtroom actors’ powers. As overlapping 
statutes and mandatory minima have spawned more charge 
bargaining, and sentencing laws have grown more complex, the actors 
have gained more dimensions along which to bargain. The Guidelines, 
which were supposed to shackle prosecutors, have instead become 
their tool. 
If plea bargaining has triumphed, it is pointless to write yet more 
articles lamenting the demise of the jury trial. The better solution is to 
view the problem in Fisher’s terms, as a balance of power. Efforts to 
destroy prosecutors’ powers by drafting paper rules, such as the 
Guidelines, have failed. The more promising possibility is to create a 
balance of power, by giving other actors more power to check line 
prosecutors. 
For example, mandatory minimum sentences are not truly 
mandatory, because prosecutors can usually choose not to charge 
them. Thus, mandatory minima skew the balance of power by binding 
judges but not prosecutors. Some states have experimented with 
forbidding prosecutorial bargaining over certain crimes.41 Prosecutors 
may, however, circumvent these laws by bargaining before 
indictment.42 The way to check prosecutorial abuse of mandatory 
minima is not by enacting paper restrictions on bargaining, but rather 
by creating a genuine balance. To balance this power, legislatures 
should restrict mandatory minima or allow judges to go below them in 
more situations. In an ideal world, legislatures would also simplify 
their criminal codes, to reduce overlapping statutes and to lessen the 
opportunities for charge bargaining. (If complex laws such as the 
Guidelines are giving prosecutors more tools, simplified laws would 
take some of these tools away.) Legislatures could also make recidivist 
enhancements turn not on prosecutorial charging decisions, but on 
whether the enhancement applies on the facts.43 These reforms, 
however, are unlikely to occur. Legislatures like giving more 
bargaining chips to prosecutors, so that legislatures both look tough on 
crime and dispose of more cases via pleas. 
If legislatures will not lead reform, perhaps head prosecutors will. 
If line prosecutors have the power to overcharge and penalize 
 
40. See Teresa White Carns & John A. Kruse, Alaska’s Ban on Plea Bargaining 
Reevaluated, 75 JUDICATURE 310, 317 (1992) (noting that the bargaining ban lasted for 
about ten years). 
41. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7 (West 2004). 
42. See CANDACE MCCOY, POLITICS AND PLEA BARGAINING: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN 
CALIFORNIA 89-128 (1993) (noting that prosecutors evaded bargaining restrictions by 
bargaining at earlier stages, before the preliminary examination or much discovery). 
43. See 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) (2000) (giving prosecutors the power to file recidivist 
enhancements, also known as prior felony informations). 
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disfavored clients or lawyers, we may want to limit charging. There are 
various ways to do this. For instance, a separate charging unit within a 
district attorney’s office would have less incentive to overcharge than 
an assistant who is trying to hoard plea-bargaining chips.44 More 
supervision of line prosecutors’ charging and nolle decisions by higher-
ranking prosecutors would restrict their freedom to overcharge and 
bargain away. For example, the Reagan and first Bush Justice 
Departments adopted policies that restricted line prosecutors’ charge 
bargaining. Prosecutors had to file the most serious readily provable 
charges, had to refrain from bargaining them away, had to put plea 
bargains in writing, and had to get supervisory approval for bargains.45 
The effect was to ensure more consistency, counteracting line 
prosecutors’ incentives to bargain to ease their own workloads. In the 
same vein, Attorney General John Ashcroft has recently forbidden 
federal prosecutors to conceal or misrepresent sentencing facts or 
acquiesce in illegal departures.46 
There are other ways to adjust prosecutors’ incentives to bargain. 
Because most head prosecutors are elected, greater transparency and 
publicity of large charge reductions could deter overcharging in the 
first place. A few may even successfully campaign on a platform of 
restricting bargaining, as the New Orleans district attorney did for a 
time.47 (The difficulty is explaining to the public why prosecutors are 
declining to prosecute many marginal cases rather than bargain them 
away.) The point is that restrictions on bargaining will come not from 
paper bargaining bans, but from creating counterweights and contrary 
incentives. 
Finally, one might reform the presentence report process, giving 
probation officers a larger role. If prosecutorial manipulation of the 
facts skews judges’ sentencing decisions, probation officers may need 
 
44. Cf. H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a 
Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1714-18 (2000) (advocating separation of 
prosecutors’ quasi-adjudicative functions in setting charges and plea bargains from the job of 
trying those cases that do not plead out). 
45. See RICHARD THORNBURGH, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PLEA 
POLICY FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS (1989) (“Thornburgh Bluesheet”), reprinted in 6 FED. 
SENTENCING REP. 347 (1994); WILLIAM F. WELD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE PROSECUTORS’ HANDBOOK ON SENTENCING GUIDELINES (1987) (“The 
Redbook”), excerpted in 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 333 (1994); George J. Terwiliger III, 
Acting Deputy Attorney General, Memorandum on Indictment and Plea Procedures Under 
Guideline Sentencing, Feb. 7, 1992, reprinted in 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 350 (1994); 
Stephen S. Trott, Associate Attorney General, Memorandum on Interim Sentencing 
Advocacy and Case Settlement Policy Under New Sentencing Guidelines, Nov. 3, 1987, 
reprinted in 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 342 (1994). 
46. John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Memorandum on Department Policies and 
Procedures Concerning Sentencing Recommendations and Sentencing Appeals (July 28, 
2003) at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/legislation/ci_03_32/$FILE/ 
AG_Guidance_Stcg_Recs.pdf. 
47. See Wright & Miller, supra note 39. 
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more independent investigative resources to ferret out what actually 
happened. This focus on powers, resources, and incentives is much 
more realistic than simply announcing a ban and pretending that 
prosecutors will not circumvent it. 
Fisher’s thoughtful history, in short, is much more than history. 
The past is prologue, and the present follows the same rules of power 
and incentive that Middlesex County did two centuries ago. Thus, his 
account sparks fruitful reflection on how to reform the system we have 
today. Fisher’s prosecutorial eye adds a welcome dimension to the 
historical literature, correcting the recent emphasis on broader social 
forces. The key is to implement these lessons by creating concrete 
checks and balances. 
